So your determination is that because people in a failed/failing economy are acting irrationally and succumbing to their baser instincts, that the aggressor in this case became mentally ill due to the economy? Are you going to claim next that mental illnesses are transmittable diseases? Are you of the mind that the aggressor was not mentally ill and was just 'faking it' to get out of jail?
Mereological study of parts and wholes applies here, along with small-world network algorithms. Internal causation is a real thing, and best explains various seemingly "utterly chance-like" statistical problems. I'm saying that the environment coupled with internal measures ultimately explain what occurred; from an outside perspective, all I can really depend on is an "external description" of the problem which attributes political and legal descriptions of the result, rather than strictly psychological. "Deranged" suggests a narrow line to the psychological; "mad" suggests a combination of issues which similarly seems to mirror the structure of "depression" which itself is a result of a combination of issues.
I subscribe to legal realism. Like I said, I don't know how we ought to treat him, which implies that I don't know much about the man himself. Legal systems analyze intention to come to (public) justice, not to ensure that the victim is redressed.
My position or statements are a comment on the adjacent, failing legal system. These governments and trade unions (via pharmaceutical industries) have become so thick with corruption that the theoretical construct of the "Observation Statement," emergent from Logical Positivism and Scientific Philosophy, is subjective to game-theoretical quantum systems.
Am I saying that ontologically mental illnesses are diseases?[1] That's a debate. However, Copycat suicide has warrantability or assertability conditions, and we can employ strategies that minimize the spread of disease to minimize the fluctuation of social statistical norm deviation, along time paradigmatic cycles.
