> may make provision for the provider of a relevant VPN service to apply to any person seeking to access its service in or from the UK age assurance which is highly effective at correctly determining whether or not that person is a child
I think you're reading it wrong. Regulations may have a provision that allows providers to apply age assurance [systems ?] if the age assurance is highly effective at determining age.
I'm always surprised how ambiguous the writing is for this kind of stuff. Maybe that's the point. If the regulations don't (may is optional) have the provision, does that mean they need to demand ID?
IMO, highly effective = our buddies' tech that we declare highly effective. The whole ID push around the world is big tech trying to set up government mandated services that you're going to be forced to pay for, either directly or via taxes.
The end game is probably digital IDs with digitally signed requests for everything you do. And, of course, corrupt individuals and criminals will somehow be able to get as many digital IDs as they want.
That money should be spent on education. We're being robbed.
> I'm always surprised how ambiguous the writing is for this kind of stuff.
That's because--
(a) The actual legislators vaguely realize that they're too lazy and stupid to get anything right in detail, so they delegate to the regulatory apparatus.
(b) Neither the legislators nor the regulators are ever quite sure what they can politically get away with actually demanding, or how fast they can politically get away with moving, so they want both the ability to grab anything that looks like they can hold it, and the ability to deny that they ever meant to ask for anything that's blowing back too hard on them.
(c) Both the legislators and the regulators want to be able to threaten various actors with draconian actions that are at least possibly authorized under that kind of vague language, in order to get concessions that they are not authorized to demand (and that would be too hot politically to give them authorization to demand).
I think you're reading it wrong. Regulations may have a provision that allows providers to apply age assurance [systems ?] if the age assurance is highly effective at determining age.
I'm always surprised how ambiguous the writing is for this kind of stuff. Maybe that's the point. If the regulations don't (may is optional) have the provision, does that mean they need to demand ID?
IMO, highly effective = our buddies' tech that we declare highly effective. The whole ID push around the world is big tech trying to set up government mandated services that you're going to be forced to pay for, either directly or via taxes.
The end game is probably digital IDs with digitally signed requests for everything you do. And, of course, corrupt individuals and criminals will somehow be able to get as many digital IDs as they want.
That money should be spent on education. We're being robbed.